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and J. M. Clark Correspondence*
By SEBASTIAN BERGER†
ABSTRACT. This article reconstructs the making of the often “over-
looked” institutional theory of social costs based on the unexploited
correspondence between John Maurice Clark and Karl William Kapp.
The reconstruction demonstrates that the institutional argument on
social costs was developed as a critique of neoclassical economics and
of post-WWII neoliberalism.
Introduction
While most economists feel at ease to identify the boundaries of the
discourse on social costs with the views of Pigou and Coase (see, for
example, Aslanbeigui and Medema 1998), the distinct institutional
argument developed by John Maurice Clark and Karl William Kapp
has been largely eclipsed from the discourse (for efforts to revitalize
this argument, see Berger 2012; Elsner, Frigato, and Ramazzotti 2012;
Berger and Steppacher 2011; Gerber and Steppacher 2011). Therefore,
this article has two main aims. Firstly, it reconstructs the making of the
institutional argument based on unexplored archival materials, that is,
the unpublished correspondence on social costs between Clark and
Kapp. The aim is to analyze for the first time their important collabo-
ration, and the development and relation of their arguments. This
reveals and corrects imprecisions in the existing literature concerning
their use of the term “social costs,” sheds new light on how Clark
influenced Kapp, and highlights the uniqueness of their institutional
argument as a full-fledged theory of social costs. Secondly, this article
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provides important evidence that the discourse on social costs can
only be fully understood as an interaction between neoclassical,
neoliberal, and institutional arguments.1 That is, the institutional
argument on social costs was developed not only as a critique of
neoclassical economics, but also as a reply to the rise of post-WWII
“neo”-liberalism, exemplified in the works of F. A. Hayek and L. Mises.
The analysis illustrates how the reaction of leading members of the
“neoliberal thought-collective” (see Mirowski and Plehwe 2009 for a
sociology of this movement) contributed to the eclipse of the institu-
tional argument on social costs. Thus, the article contributes an
important detail to the account of the gradual demise of institutional
economics in the period of the great neoliberal transformation of
economics (Lee 2009; Rutherford 2011; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009).
By reconstructing (Rorty 1984) the making of the institutional argu-
ment of social costs in the context of the social costs discourse with
members of the “neoliberal thought-collective,” this article contributes
to the recent sociology of economic knowledge.
The Kapp-Clark Correspondence in Context
The Kapp-Clark correspondence on social costs is situated within the
larger context of the demise of institutional economics as the domi-
nant economic theory. Institutional economics is both a critique of
neoclassical economics and a full-fledged and influential movement
within economics (see Rutherford 2011; Kapp 2011; Dugger 2012).
According to Rutherford, between 1926 and 1957 Clark was the
leading institutional economist at Columbia, which was the center of
institutional economics until the latter’s eventual demise. The institu-
tionalist complement that emerged there during the 1920s was given
a major boost by the hiring of Clark as Research Professor in Eco-
nomics. Clark described his work as “social-institutional-dynamic
theory,” developing a “realist economics” and an approach to social-
liberal planning. Before coming to Columbia, he had already critiqued
neoclassical theory and called for a more properly scientific econom-
ics that was relevant to the issues of its time. The year he arrived
at Columbia, he published “Social Control of Business” (1926),
which further developed ideas first expressed in “Overhead Costs”
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([1923] 1931). His book discussed a large number of market failures
that called for additional social controls. Market failure and regulation
were key areas of institutional economics at Columbia. Clark agreed
with legal realists in viewing law as a key instrument of social control
to improve economic outcomes. Clark even co-taught a seminar on
law and economics in the 1924 and 1925 terms. Until the late 1930s the
institutional program at Columbia was well established. According to
Kenneth Arrow, the Veblenian influence was still present at Columbia
in the early 1940s; however, things had begun to change and the
research program fissured into such a variety of approaches that by
the late 1930s, even the leading institutionalists W. Mitchell and Clark
would no longer acknowledge a distinct and coherent institutionalism.
As elsewhere, the significance of mathematical economics grew and
was symbolized by the hiring of George Stigler in 1947. By the early
1950s the department was divided between the prewar institutional-
ists, such as Clark, and the postwar neoclassical economists, such as
Stigler. Clark retired in 1953 (for more details of this account of the
situation at Columbia, see Rutherford 2011; for details concerning the
development of Clark’s economics, see Shute 1997).
Kapp had been a research assistant at the Institute for Social
Research at Columbia and an instructor of economics at Columbia
between 1937 and 1945 (for a brief biography, see Berger and
Steppacher 2011), when institutional economics was still dominant but
had entered into its declining stage. When Columbia’s postwar hiring
strategy favored neoclassical economists, Kapp left for Wesleyan Uni-
versity (CT) (see the accounts of Lee 2003 and Rutherford 2011 on the
suppression and demise of institutional economics). The tremendous
influence of Clark’s work on overhead costs and social economics is
acknowledged in Kapp’s preface to “Social Costs of Private Enterprise”
(1950). Its second—revised and enlarged—edition was entitled “Social
Costs of Business Enterprise” (1963), signaling that the core of the
institutional argument on social costs had already been stated by
Veblen’s “Theory of Business Enterprise” (1904). Kapp’s work was
widely reviewed and translated into many languages worldwide and
made a significant impact on such events in the environmental move-
ment in the 1970s as the 1972 UN Conference on Environment and
Development, the formation of Ignacy Sachs’ Center for Environment
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and Development, and the Socialist Environment and Resource
Association (SERA). Friedrich Pollock—a leading member of the
Frankfurt School and close friend of Kapp—invited Kapp to partici-
pate in the newly constituted Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt.
Kapp’s major project, however, to initiate an international association
of institutional economists in collaboration with Gunnar Myrdal, even-
tually failed in the late 1960s due to a lack of funding.2 After reaching
its pinnacle of influence on the social costs discourse in the early
1970s, Kapp’s institutional argument on social costs (see below) has
gradually been eclipsed from the discourse.
J. M. Clark’s Theory of Overhead Costs and Cost Shifting
The following section shows how Clark derived the concept of
cost shifting from his argument on overhead costs. This provides the
intellectual context for the correspondence on Kapp’s institutional
theory of the social costs of private enterprise, as it is based on Clark’s
notion of cost shifting.3 Clark’s earliest letter in the Kapp Archives is
dated Feb. 6, 1941 and is a reply to Kapp:
Dear Dr. Kapp, Your outline and sample chapters are very interesting; and
I am naturally interested in your project of developing and applying some
of my ideas. . . . Needless to say, I shall be interested in how your study
develops.
What was the nature of these “ideas”? Clark developed his ideas mainly
in “Overhead Costs” (1931), arguing that “overhead costs” refer to an
entire family of ideas, but they have one essential thing in common . . .
they refer to costs that cannot be traced home and attributed to particular
units of business . . . most of the real problems involve one other fact;
namely that an increase or decrease in output does not involve a propor-
tionate increase or decrease in cost. . . . the causes are real world com-
plexities . . . unused productive capacity . . . “idle overhead” . . . unused
powers of production. (Clark 1931: 1)
We have a considerable body of economic generalizations, bearing on the
facts of that overhead costs are decidedly at variance with the assumptions
and conclusions of that type of economics which searches for the condi-
tions of a perfect equilibrium of supply and demand. (Clark 1931 in Gruchy
1967: 364)
Clark argued that the development of the forces of production
in the 20th century, characterized by large amounts of fixed capital
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equipment, a specialized workforce, and disequilibrium, required a
corresponding theory of costs (Gruchy 1967: 365–366). Reviewing the
conceptual history of costs, Clark concluded that “[t]he entire idea of
expenses of production is . . . a rather recent one” (Clark 1931: 1) and
that the neoclassical theory of costs was modeled on a long bygone
economic reality where “virtually every element which economists
now think of as an expense of production was paid for in such a
fashion that each item could be directly charged to an item of product”
(Clark 1931: 2). Neoclassical cost theory only held true under unique
circumstances in which “expenses were virtually all traceable directly
to units of product, and overhead costs were virtually non-existent”
(Clark 1931: 2). Clark concluded that the “prevalent ideas on expenses
of production date back to the domestic system and are not really
appropriate to any later stage of industrial development” (Clark 1931:
2). Yet Clark argued that a proper theory of costs was crucial because
“the backbone of the science of economics is the balancing of value
against cost” (Clark 1931: 17). Clark asked the crucial question how
the costs of producing an additional unit of output are determined:
Is the carload of lumber worth carrying if it covers all the costs that can be
attributed to that single carload? . . . Shall we count the costs that would
keep on even if the railroad shut down entirely? (Clark 1931: 19)
Clark concluded
Evidently, “cost” is an ambiguous term and . . . requires a thorough
re-examination. (Clark 1931: 19)
There is no natural system of prices in the old sense. Cost prices do not
mean anything definite anymore. (Clark 1931: 32)
What is counted as “costs” is thus a “convention” with “latitude”
(Shute 1997: 60). This definition is fully in the tradition of institutional
economics that focuses on the effects of habits of thought and
institutions in the cumulative causation of the economic process. Clark
used the concept of “shifting and conversion of overhead costs” of
human labor in the business cycle4 to elaborate this aspect of institu-
tional theory of costs (Clark 1931: 25–27):
The cost to society of supporting a group of laborers does not vary
with their output, for this cost goes on even though the laborers produce
nothing, as is the case in periods of enforced idleness, which comes in the
depression phase of the business cycle. (Gruchy 1967: 360)
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Clark also extended the concept of overhead costs to mining and
farming and called it “an ultimate fact” of human cost that must be
maintained in depressions (Gruchy: 361–362). He determined the
problem to be that business enterprises did not treat their costs as
overhead but as variable costs. The converting of constant overhead
costs into variable costs determined the process by which producers
judged the profitability of production. Clark observed this, for
example, in the business cycle when slowing sales trigger quantity
adjustments by the laying off of workers (Clark 1931: 27–30). Clark
introduced the terms “shifting and conversion of overhead costs” to
describe how businesses make the workers responsible for their
own maintenance, or throw the burden on society. These business
measures create what Clark called the “accelerator effect” of laying off
workers and further reducing purchasing power, leading to a deterio-
ration of productive facilities, i.e., a kind of social damage accelerator.
Clark described this in a metaphor: “All of which irresistibly suggests
a man on a rock, jumping into the water for fear the tide will rise
and wet him” (Clark 1931: 29). According to Clark, this reflected the
conflict between social and private interests, since the former required
capacity output while the latter sought to maximize revenue over
variable costs (Clark 1931: 28–29).
This idea of cost shifting in the conflicting relationship between
individual and social interests was a restatement of Veblen’s source
theme that portrayed social waste as a consequence of the fact that
business enterprise did not channel economic activity in ways con-
sistent with public interests (Rutherford 2011: 36). Veblen’s pioneering
analysis of institutions (including property rights, business-like and
finance-like control of industry; see Gerber and Steppacher 2011)
focused on social waste and damages. Veblen argued that capital
resides in the continuity of ownership and that in a system of business
enterprise and absentee ownership the “strong arm intervenes” to
shuffle property rights so as to control and increase private pecuniary
returns, which includes a subreptitious and predatory shifting of costs
and thereby an avoidance of responsibility. Moreover, Veblen argued
that this process of realignment of property rights via subreption and
predation not only failed to guarantee, but systematically disregarded,
the maintenance and efficient use of the material funds of production.
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Veblen’s examples included natural resource depletion—timber-
lands, fur-bearing animals, oil fields—next to sabotage of industrial
and workers’ efficiency, causing unnecessary social waste (Krall and
Gowdy 2011).
The rethinking of the notion of costs led Clark to reformulate the
notions of efficiency and accounting (Gruchy 1967: 365–367). Clark
argued that estimating the efficiency of the total economy could not be
undertaken by using data from private accounting because it did not
account for all the costs of production. Clark proposed a new form of
accounting that would indicate the discrepancies between commercial
and community measures of efficiency. He supported a social cost
keeping as a “form of economic reckoning which cuts through the
sophisms of private financial accountancy and calls social waste by its
true name”5 (Gruchy 1967: 369). This new social accounting would be
an effective device for judging the efficiency of the modern economy
as a creator of “human values.” According to Clark, it was the duty of
economists to reveal the shifted and neglected costs of operating
our industrial system that were left unpaid by businesses, such as
idle men and machinery, destruction of utilities through fashion,
waste resulting from competitive advertisement, and private business
secrecy. Clark viewed this as a problem of bringing this information to
the public’s attention and of putting an end to unpaid costs (Gruchy
1967: 369–370). Clark hoped that once it was understood how the
legal and institutional matrix produced market values, the discrepan-
cies between market and social valuation could be reduced (Gruchy
1967: 368).
A knowledge of the laws of overhead costs . . . opens many doors and is
one of the indispensable avenues . . . overhead costs are not exceptions to
a general economic law: they are the general law. (Clark 1931: 479)
In conclusion, Clark’s argument on overhead costs and cost shifting
constitute a further development of Veblen’s ideas on social waste
with a view to justify increasing social controls. In this institutional
economics theory, the legal and institutional structure determines
the extent to which firms have to pay the costs of production, so that
prices based on costs including “mark-up” (Lee 1999) are a function of
the institutional framework of society. Without proper legal restric-
tions and social controls, the latter remains a system of cost shifting,
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a vicious circle of accelerating social damages. This theory of the
institutional causes of cost shifting and social damages was deve-
loped by Kapp into the institutional theory of social costs, which is
the subject matter of the following correspondence with Clark.
The Kapp-Clark Correspondence on Social Costs6
How far did Clark influence Kapp in developing the institutional
theory of social costs as a critique of the system of business enterprise
and as an argument for social accounting and controls? What was the
nature of their interactions? In the above cited letter (February 6,
1941), Clark raised his “chief concern . . . of balancing the emphasis
on the negative and the positive side of the critique.” Clark contrasted
the setting in which “Overhead Costs” was written to the setting of the
1940s:
[my early work was in a] setting characterized by detail attempts to correct
particular defects in the system of private enterprise, involving no serious
threat to the evolutionary continuance of the “institution” itself . . . the
present setting is different, in that breakdown and radical transformation,
which are not intended by the majority of the population and for which we
are not prepared, are really threatened.
Clark warned Kapp of the danger of systemic breakdown, remind-
ing him to be aware of his responsibility in writing his book on the
social costs of private enterprise:
therefore it seems to me particularly necessary at present to do justice to
the elements of positive value in the institution [private enterprise]—in
short to give a balanced presentation. . . . [Your] study seems to judge the
system by ideal standards. And the use of ideal standards seems to me
justifiable, if one keeps in mind the fact that they are unattainable, and that
any actual alternative scheme would have its own imperfections to balance
against the ones the existing system reveals. . . . If one of the alternatives is
a thoroughgoing transformation to a collectivist system, its imperfections
are necessarily conjectural, but might be quite serious; and they need to be
recognized.
Additionally, Clark raised serious doubts whether a collectivist
system would be inclined to institutionalize a “system of social
accountancy,” fearing that the imperfections would simply be shifted
from the “machinery of the markets” to the “political machinery.” This
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criticism is also the core of the last documented intellectual interaction
between Clark and Kapp, via Clark’s book review of “Social Costs of
Private Enterprise” in the Yale Review entitled “The New Economic
Community.” In it Clark praised the systematic elaboration of the
idea that an “ ‘enterprise’ should reckon with all the costs it occasions,
including those the business unit can shift to other members of
society.” And with regard to neoclassical economics: “if one man’s
gnat is another man’s camel . . . Kapp presents theorists with evidence
of the size of the camels they have been swallowing . . . .” However,
Clark also raised questions: “has [Kapp] at certain points, charged as
costs of private enterprise things that are really costs of modern
methods of production under any form of organization [?] . . . is there
a sound basis for presuming that a socialist government would treat
these matters more justly than they are treated by a state which
combines ‘private enterprise’ with many sided welfare policies? Is a
municipality more likely to abolish the smoke nuisance from its own
plant than to order a private plant to do the like?” Clark concluded that
while questions remained, Kapp’s book was important because it
brought together ample empirical evidence for the existence of social
costs, suggesting the scope and magnitude of the problem (Clark
1950: 173–174).
Both documents show not only that Kapp’s critique of private
enterprise was too unbalanced for Clark’s taste, but also that Clark’s
own views on the role of private enterprise had changed since the
1920s. Since the draft of the manuscript reviewed by Clark is not
available, we do not know in how far Kapp modified his critique. In
this context it is of interest that Kapp’s letter to Clark on December 12,
1945 referred to a working title that differs from the later book
publication: “I am very grateful to you for having read parts of my
manuscript on Social Costs and Returns which I submitted to you.”
We do not know whether Clark’s influence was decisive on Kapp’s
decision not to publish roughly half of his original book manuscript,
which contained a discussion of planning for social returns of “utilities
which diffuse themselves among all members of society, . . . that are
to a large extent inappropriable by individual producers and cannot
always be appraised in monetary terms”7 (Kapp, unpublished ms.
III). Kapp had originally developed the interconnected themes of
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social costs and returns in his dissertation (Kapp 1936). In the unpub-
lished manuscript, Kapp discussed social returns
derived from the gratification of collective needs; from international eco-
nomic policies designed to achieve a balanced economy . . . and from
the improvement of transportation facilities . . . scientific research, multiple
purpose projects (such as TVA), and the maintenance of a social minimum
with respect to essential foodstuffs, medical care, housing, and education.
(Kapp, unpublished ms. III)
While the issues of social costs and planning for social returns are
intimately related, the “returns” portion was not published and
remains in the Kapp Archives. Clark’s warnings may have caused
Kapp to improve and balance his argument on social returns, an
improvement evident in his later work. For example, he published the
article “Social Costs and Social Benefits—A Contribution to Normative
Economics” (1963) in the same year as “Social Costs of Business
Enterprise.” This article, as well as various others from the late 1950s
and early 1960s, resulted from research on the social costs and social
benefits in development projects in India and the Philippines, and
addressed the social costs and lack of planning for social returns by
ineffective public administrations (Kapp 1959a, 1959b, 1960, 1961).
These articles display Kapp’s openness to balancing his argument,
criticizing social costs regardless of whether they were created by
private or public entities. Yet, Kapp also maintained that planning for
social returns and the minimization of social costs were important
goals of economic development policy and that important improve-
ments were achieved. Starting from the interconnected problems of
social costs and social returns, Kapp developed a full-fledged theo-
retical framework of democratic controls of science and technology,
socioecological indicators, and social minima (see below for more
details; for a full elaboration, see Kapp 2011).
The second half of Clark’s letter (February 6, 1941) asked Kapp
to consider the question of freedom. Clark saw “value in the device
of imagining the setting up of a new community, with our present
knowledge.” But he asked Kapp to consider
what sphere would be left to the market process, and what imperfections
in that sphere would be tolerated in the interest of minimising central
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regimentation and preserving the prerequisites of liberty, both of thought
and expression as well as of consumption and production?
It seems that Clark perceived Kapp’s critique not only as too
unbalanced, but also with too little focus on the questions of the
shortcomings of alternative modes of organization, such as socialism,
and the prerequisites of “liberty.” Curiously, this criticism is similar to
the one levied against Kapp in a book review by the Chicago liberal
economist Frank Knight, who had institutional leanings (Knight 1951;
Berger 2012; Rutherford 2010: 30–32; Emmett 2010: 282). As an exile
from Nazi Germany, an affiliate of the Frankfurt School, and a student
of the poet and teacher Ernst Wiechert, Kapp took the issue of
integrating freedom with the alleviation of human suffering very
seriously. Perhaps due to Clark’s criticisms, Kapp published “Eco-
nomic Planning and Freedom” (1950) the same year as his “Social
Costs of Private Enterprise,” in which he argued for a substantive
understanding of freedom that included planning for social returns.
Clark’s letter finished on a friendly note: “needless to say, I shall be
interested to see how your study develops.”
Four years later, on December 4, 1945, Clark wrote down his
detailed comments regarding the overall scope of Kapp’s draft, as well
as its specific arguments. His letter consists of four densely typewritten
pages, showing Clark’s efforts to further influence and aid in the
development of Kapp’s institutional theory of social costs. As in the
previous reply, the draft upon which the comments were based is not
available, so that the basis for interpretation is missing. Yet the letter
provides Clark’s more general comments as well:
It is interesting that you are reviving the discussion of extra-market values
and costs and putting content into it, with some approach to measurement.
Importantly, Clark addressed the semantic differences of Kapp’s
concept of “social costs”:
[your definition of] “social” values and costs differs from mine in applying
to non-market quantities only, where mine [Clark’s] included also the
quantities the market “measures”.
This shows that Clark defined social costs as nonmarket plus market
costs in the neoclassical tradition of Arthur C. Pigou (1929). This may
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reflect Clark’s attempt to improve neoclassical theory rather than
repudiate it (Lee 2009: 33), which had led him to dedicate his theory
of overhead costs as “a very small contribution toward realizing his
[that is, his father’s neoclassical] conception of a dynamic economics”
(Clark in Gruchy 1967: 357). Throughout his work Kapp roundly
rejected neoclassical economics and its conceptual framework in its
entirety, criticizing its ineffective and overly conservative reform pro-
posals. Kapp noted in “Social Costs of Business Enterprise” (1963) that
Pigou had radicalized his political-economic conclusions by the late
1940s when Pigou (1947) had argued that the social inefficiencies had
reached a level that justifies the socialization of the means of produc-
tion. Yet Kapp maintained that Pigou’s neoclassical concept of exter-
nal costs was imbued with the limitations of the neoclassical theories
of price and value, as well as its closed system and equilibrium
preconceptions that preclude an adequate understanding of the cir-
cular cumulative causation underlying the problem of social costs and
its complex value dimensions, as well as its open system character
(Kapp 1963, 1976; Berger 2009).
Instead, Kapp distinguished private costs from social costs (social
losses, damages, inefficiencies) to emphasize that businesses privatize
profits and socialize as many costs as they can. Kapp defined social
costs as that part of the costs of production that businesses shift to
society to increase their profits, thus avoiding responsibility. Accord-
ing to Kapp, adding social to private costs results in total costs. In
the literature, this important difference between Kapp’s and Clark’s
definition of the concept of social costs has been obscured. This may
be due to the fact that both agreed on the notion of cost shifting but
disagreed on what to call the shifted costs (see Prasch 2005). Thus, it
is Kapp’s contribution to have elevated the concept of social costs
to a stylized fact for a critique of capitalism, the system of business or
private enterprise, and formal rationality, further mending and bring-
ing into the open ideas of Marx, Veblen, and Weber.8 In “The Social
Costs of Private Enterprise” (1950) Kapp provides a chapter on the
conceptual history of social costs, showing his commitment to engage
and acknowledge the large variety of previous contributions and
arguments on social costs and returns. It is also Kapp’s contribution to
have clearly articulated how the institutional theory of social costs
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differs from neoclassical (see above) and neoliberal approaches (see
below).
The significance of Clark’s comments is acknowledged by Kapp in
his subsequent letter (December 12, 1945):
Dear Professor Clark: I am very grateful to you for having read parts of my
manuscript on Social Costs and Social Returns which I submitted to you.
. . . I have studied your comments very carefully and I found them most
pertinent . . . I feel that you have called my attention to serious weaknesses
in the formulation of my ideas, and in most instances I have found it
possible to reformulate my conclusions in a more careful and more
satisfactory manner.
However, Kapp’s handwritten remarks on the margins of Clark’s
letter indicate that he did not agree with all of his comments, leading
him to reply to Clark:
The following is a brief reformulation of my ideas—a reformulation which
I owe to your challenge and which I shall incorporate in the introductory
chapter. . . . The thesis of this book is briefly that the orthodox appraisal
and interpretation of the economic process in the unplanned market
economy is invalidated by various obstacles to rational conduct and the
phenomenon of social costs and social returns.
Clark’s remark that the problem of social costs had already been
successfully addressed by Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner and that
Kapp was “beating a straw-man” challenged Kapp to clarify his aims
with regard to developments in economics:
The presuppositions of classical and neoclassical equilibrium economics
continue to determine both the methods and the scope of modern value
theory as can be easily ascertained . . . [by] the more recent system of
economics which is based upon Keynes’ General Theory . . . modern text-
books . . . the works of such intransigent economic liberals as Professor
F.A. Hayek, L. Mises, and L. Robbins . . . [even] some socialists of the 20th
century have so accustomed themselves to the methods of thinking of
neoclassical equilibrium analysis that they answer Mises’ challenge of
socialist planning by proclaiming that the socialist economy would solve
the problem of allocating scarce resources among competing ends with the
aid of the price mechanism and the competitive calculus. There is no hint
that in order to solve the economic problem a planned economy is likely
to base its economic decisions upon a social evaluation of total outlays
and total benefits which . . . will have to take into account social costs and
social returns. In other words, I am not aware of the fact that O. Lange and
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Professor Lerner have any fundamental quarrel with traditional equilibrium
theory, and I have the impression that there is no room in the conceptual
system of these writers for the phenomena of social cost and social returns.
. . . I am also aware that value theory continues to be confined to the
search for levels of equilibrium “of the exchange value sort,” and not in
terms of social value despite the fact that . . . economic decisions of the
greatest importance are based on social choices and preferences.
This shows that Kapp aimed at a critique of all economic theories—
even the progressive ones by Lange and Lerner—insofar as they
adopted core elements of neoclassical economics and ignore the
question of social valuation:
When I said that the search for levels of equilibrium ought to be aban-
doned, I meant actually that the exclusive preoccupation . . . with prob-
lems of exchange value requires supplementation by a study of social
value. . . . I like to hope that in the light of this letter there is perhaps a
greater area of agreement between your “Preface to Social Economics” and
my “Social Costs and Social Returns” than it appeared to you after reading
the manuscript. With renewed thanks for your kindness of reading the
manuscript, I am Very Sincerely Yours K. William Kapp
Kapp clearly tried to convince Clark that their works were in
agreement concerning the importance of social valuation in economic
decision making. In the same vein Kapp explains in the unpublished
draft versions of the introduction to “The Social Costs of Private
Enterprise” that he aimed at a critique of social costs under capitalism,
and of neoclassical and neoliberalism theories that do not capture
these realities:
As an analysis of the social inefficiency of the unplanned market economy
the study was bound to assume the character of a critique not only of
capitalism but also of traditional equilibrium economics. (Kapp, unpub-
lished manuscript I)
the re-orientation of economics; . . . [exploration of] the possibilities for the
setting up of valid criteria for economic planning and the formulation for
economic policy, and perhaps to prepare the way for the elaboration of a
positive theory of social value are the chief ultimate purposes of this
inquiry. (Kapp, unpublished manuscript II)
The final words of Kapp’s letter and the unpublished versions
confirm that Kapp identified with Clark’s project of “Preface to Social
Economics” (1936), for which he saw the argument on social costs to
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be only a preliminary step. Kapp actively pursued this social econom-
ics or institutional “foundations project” for the rest of his life (Berger
and Steppacher 2011).
Institutionalism vs. Neoliberalism: The Discourse on Social Costs
The above letter to Clark also shows that Kapp was among the
economists in the institutional movement who directed his work
against the “intransigent” liberalism of Friedrich A. Hayek. Moreover,
the unpublished draft version of the preface to “Social Costs of Private
Enterprise” (1950) states that the core thesis of the book is directed
against a revival of liberalism reflected by the success of Hayek’s and
Mises’s works (for details, see Berger 2012). Unlike Clark’s contribu-
tion on overhead cost, Kapp’s social costs argument emerged less as
a critique of neoclassical economics than as a late reply to von Mises’s
argument in the European socialist accounting debate of the 1920s.
Kapp’s dissertation “The Planned Economy and International Trade”
(1936) developed the social costs argument as a socialist “countervail-
ing impossibility thesis” against Mises’s famous neoliberal impossibility
thesis. That is, according to Kapp, an accounting system based on
market values cannot account for the social value of damages because
the latter cannot find “value expression” in exchanges between iso-
lated individuals (Kapp 1936; Berger 2012). Therefore, Kapp con-
cluded, allocation in a pure market economy cannot be rational. Thus,
Kapp’s theory on social costs was originally motivated by the emerg-
ing Austrian neoliberalism in Geneva (Plehwe 2009). At this time,
Kapp was also closely affiliated with and influenced by the Frankfurt
School, exiled—like Kapp—in Geneva, so that the initial development
of his argument on social costs can be seen also as a contribution to
the Frankfurt School’s post-Weberian project, which Foucault identi-
fied as trying to show the “irrational rationality of capitalism” (Foucault
1979: 106).
In this context it is of interest that Clark’s book title “Alternative
to Serfdom” (ATS) (1948) is a clear reference to Hayek’s “Road to
Serfdom” (RTS) (1944), and that Kapp’s copy of ATS shows intense
underlining and three handwritten pages of notes, indicating his
agreement with Clark’s arguments, in particular the beneficial role of
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unions and the need to focus economic inquiry on human needs.
Kapp’s copy of Hayek’s RTS likewise shows 10 marks in the margins,
including pages 37–39 on social costs and social returns, and con-
tains six newspaper clippings from the debate stirred by Hayek’s
RTS and Mises’s “Bureaucracy” (1944). Hayek’s views on social
costs evolved after RTS, and his mature point of view on social costs
was diametrically opposed to Kapp’s. This became especially evident
in Hayek’s justification of the social costs of Pinochet’s dictatorship,
which Hayek considered “a necessary evil” in implementing the
(neo-)liberal agenda (see Farrant, McPhail, and Berger 2012: 530).
Like Hayek, Kapp also contributed to a newspaper debate following
the installment of Pinochet’s dictatorship. In his article, which the
editor of the Swiss newspaper “National-Zeitung” had solicited, Kapp
warned of a new “right-wing extremism that puts on the costume of
liberalism” (Kapp 1974: 6). Yet Kapp mentioned no names in this
article, nor did he direct his final manuscript of “Social Costs of
Private Enterprise” or any of his articles against Hayek or Mises. The
most probable explanation is that Kapp hoped for a genuine dia-
logue on the substance of the issue by avoiding an unbalanced ad
hominem attack.9 Kapp’s intellectual engagement with neoliberal
economics is also evidenced by a book review that critically assessed
Eucken’s posthumous work on economic policy (Kapp 1953). Kapp
noticed the distinct constructivist element in Eucken’s work, which,
according to Mirowski (Mirowski 2009), is the hallmark of neolibe-
ralism and distinguishes it from laissez-faire neoclassical economics.
Kapp’s main criticism was that this approach excluded evidence that
is contrary to its preconceptions, that is, that Eucken considered
social costs as minor exceptions rather than systemic problems that
require more substantive controls. Kapp also noted that Eucken’s
“idealtype” of the exchange economy is too abstract, with no allow-
ance for “less harmonious” facts of economic life, such as systemic
social costs.
It is important to note that Kapp’s social minima proposal for
minimizing social costs (Kapp 2011) is a substantivist reply to minima
proposals developed by (neo-)liberal economists, that is, the minima
proposal of Walter Eucken (Foucault 1979: 141, 204–206) and Hayek’s
“non-discretionary rules” argument (for a discussion of Hayek’s
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argument, see Burczak 2011). The difference lies in the extent to
which Kapp wanted social minima to control the economic process.
That is, he proposed a full-fledged democratic governance of science
and technology decisions, including socioecological indicators, to
guarantee the maintenance of social minima (Kapp 2011). Contrary
to neoliberalism, Kapp’s approach endorses a social and democratic
dynamic centered on universal and scientifically objectifiable human
needs, and the absolute value of human life in the Kantian tradition.
The neoliberal approach that turns human life and needs into a
means to an end is rejected by Kapp, so that social costs cannot be
justified as a “necessary evil” to achieve economic growth, profitable
exchanges, or some neoliberal notion of purely formal economic
freedom. Kapp dubbed his approach “new rational humanism” (Kapp
1985) based on a theory of integrated social knowledge centered on
and derived from a scientific biocultural concept of the human being.
In this, Kapp pulled together research on human needs from various
humanist scientists and psychologists, for example, Abraham Maslow
and Erich Fromm. Kapp placed this approach in the tradition of
European substantivist arguments made by Carl Menger and Karl
Polanyi (Berger 2008) but also American biocultural approaches
of Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey (Kapp 1961; Gerber and
Steppacher 2011; Kapp 2011).10 In sum, Kapp’s institutional theory of
social costs was part of his larger intellectual project of a new rational
humanism and an attempt to counter neoliberal arguments.
The success of Kapp’s institutional theory of social costs during the
1950s led various key figures of the “neoliberal thought-collective”
to respond or comment directly, for example, Frank Knight (1951),
Guido Calabresi (1961), James Buchanan (1962), and Wilfred
Beckerman (1972) (for details, see Berger 2012). Post-WWII develop-
ments in economics need to be seen as a reaction to institutional
economics, with the Chicago School sharply at ideological odds with
institutionalism (Rutherford 2011: 351; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Van
Horn et al. 2011). As Rutherford has pointed out, Chicago economists
often modified or reworked existing institutional economics’ ideas
(Rutherford 2010: 36). In the discourse on social costs, this is best
demonstrated by how Coase (1960) and Stigler (1966) contributed to
the discourse on social costs. Both remained conspicuously silent on
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previous institutional arguments and celebrated their argument on the
institution of property rights as a “scientific discovery.” Stigler’s “Coase
Theorem” shifted the discourse from the problem of “social costs”
to a problem of “transaction costs,” corresponding with his lack of
interest in actual social damages (see Medema 2011). Instead of
seeking ways to prevent social costs ex ante, which was the primary
concern of Kapp’s theory of social costs, Stigler focused on con-
structing ex post market-based solutions by minimizing transaction
costs and assigning property rights. Stigler did not engage previous
institutional arguments concerning the predatory and subreptitious
aspects involved in assigning property rights and the impossibility of
adequately reflecting social and ecological values in individual market
exchanges.
It seems likely that Stigler’s contribution to the discourse on social
costs was part of his many “demolition derbies” against institutional
economics, which he hated: “Institutional economics is dying out at
a fantastic rate—though still not fast enough to suit me” (Stigler, in
Rutherford 2011: 328).11 Due to his overt dislike for institutional
economics, it seems reasonable to presume that his silence on Clark’s
and Kapp’s well-known arguments on social costs was not an inno-
cent oversight. Clark’s work was so prominent that he had received
the Francis A. Walker medal by the American Economic Association in
1952, “given to that living American economist who . . . has made over
the course of his life the most distinguished contribution to econom-
ics” (Shute 1997). Instead of seeking a discourse with institutional
economists, Stigler promoted Knight’s “Some Fallacies in the Interpre-
tation of Social Costs” (1924) in his publications on price theory
(Stigler and Boulding 1952) and in his “Coase Theorem” (1966).
Additionally, Stigler was among the “commentators” who encouraged
Coase to write “The Problem of Social Costs” (Coase 1960, fn 1; see the
“Eureka” event in Medema 2011). Coase refers to Stigler’s argument
that the problem of social costs should be conceived of as purely
“reciprocal nature” (Coase 1960: 2), rather than social or systemic.
Much like Stigler, Coase adopted a very disparaging attitude towards
institutional economics, describing it as “a mass of descriptive material
waiting for a theory, or a fire” (Coase in Rutherford 2010: 25), and also
remaining silent on Clark’s and Kapp’s arguments on social costs.
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Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the dominant narrative about the dis-
course on social costs is incomplete. The findings show that the
discourse includes Clark’s and Kapp’s institutional theory of cost
shifting and social costs. The latter reflects a distinct and clearly
distinguishable institutional argument on social costs, which further
develops earlier ideas by Veblen and Marx. Thus, the institutional
theory of social costs is a clearly distinguishable alternative to neo-
classical and neoliberal arguments. The Kapp-Clark correspondence
shows that Clark was influential in the development of Kapp’s insti-
tutional theory of social costs and social returns. Throughout their
works, both economists harnessed the enormous power of their
argument on cost shifting as a rationale for increasing social controls
of the economy and the development of a genuine social economics.
Yet the archival materials also illustrate that both economists differed
on the definition of social costs, and that Clark encouraged Kapp to
balance his critique and to consider improving certain weaknesses of
his argument. Their correspondence provides further important docu-
mentation that Kapp developed the institutional theory on social costs
to counter “intransigent [neo-]liberalism,” and that leading neoliberal
economists sought strategies to undermine and eclipse the institu-
tional argument. Thus, the discourse on social costs cannot be fully
understood without appreciating the role of the institutional argument
on social costs. This account differs markedly from other recent
accounts, ending the hermeneutic “stop play” strategy that fails to
acknowledge institutional theories. Thereby, this article contributes
to the important advancement of understanding social costs via the
“ethics of play” (Vilhauer 2010; Samuels 1990; Arrington 1990).
Notes
1. For an elaboration of Kapp’s institutional argument against the return
of liberalism and the reaction of leading neoliberal economists, refer to Berger
(2012).
2. It is noteworthy that the financial support for institutional econo-
mists waned since the 1950s, with the Ford Foundation being the last to
quit funding institutional research by the early 1960s (Rutherford 2011).
Myrdal’s and Kapp’s project to start an international association of institutional
1124 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology
economists was denied funding by the Swedish Research Council in 1968
(for details concerning Kapp’s intellectual project, see Berger and Steppacher
2011). This may be seen as a consequence of changes in the way economic
science was funded with several foundations increasingly supporting
neoliberal ideas, for example, the Volcker Fund and the Walgreen Foundation
(Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Nik-Khah 2011).
3. See also Swaney and Evers (1989), who have located this important
concept at the core of the institutional theory of social costs.
4. Clark’s “Accelerator Principle” is based on the idea of self-reinforcing
causation (vicious circle) or circular and cumulative causation, which is one of
the key concepts of nonequilibrium economics (Berger 2009).
5. This issue was at the heart of the European socialist accounting debate
in the 1920s (Kapp 1936).
6. The Kapp-Clark correspondence—retrieved from the Kapp Archive—
contains five letters. Two letters deal with Kapp’s article on consumer theory,
“Rational Human Conduct” (1943), and three letters concern Kapp’s book
manuscript “Social Costs of Private Enterprise” (1950). The present analysis
only refers to the latter set of letters.
7. The section on social returns was never published. In this, Kapp
provides an institutional version of Paul Samuelson’s neoclassical “public
goods” argument (Samuelson 1954),
8. Leading authors using the institutional argument on social costs in the
tradition of Kapp work are Swaney and Evers (1989), Swaney (2006), Sherman
et al. (2007), Foster (2000, 2010), and Martinez-Alier (2002).
9. For a similar thesis, see Swaney and Evers (1989) and (Franzini 2006).
10. Today Kapp’s approach resembles in important ways Amartya Sen’s
“capabilities approach” and Max Neef’s human needs matrix.
11. Recent archival research has elevated the role played by Stigler as a
key protagonist of the Chicago School with a coherent agenda in the areas of
law and economics, and science and technology (Nik-Khah 2011), contribut-
ing to the demise of the institutional argument on social costs.
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